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Let all with something to say be free to express themselves.
The true and sound will survive.
- FREDRICK S. SIEBERT'

INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 2011, the headline adorning the front page of
The Daily Tar Heel, the student newspaper of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill ("UNC"), all but guaranteed controversy:
"UNC Christian A Capella Group Ousts Gay Member." Sure
* @ 2012 Andrew D. Brown.
1. Fredrick S. Siebert, The Libertarian Theory of the Press, in FOUR THEORIES OF
THE PRESS: THE AUTHORITARIAN, LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND
SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE AND Do 39,45 (1st ed.

1956).
2. Andy Thomason, Christian Group Ousts Gay Member, THE DAILY TAR HEEL,
Aug. 30,2011, at 1, availableat http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2011/08
/4e5c6c791822c. Group leaders stressed that the member was removed because of his
theological beliefs about sexuality, rather than his sexuality itself. Id.
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enough, the events following Psalm 100's unanimous decision to vote
out a member due to his beliefs regarding homosexuality prompted
numerous letters to the editor, a discussion panel hosted by the
School of Journalism, 4 and even an official university review of the
organization's actions. After the university decided that the group's
action did not violate the school's nondiscrimination policy
("NDP"),' calls immediately came to revise the policy,' which had
been in place since a 2005 lawsuit prompted changes to the thenexisting policy on First Amendment grounds.' In January 2012, a task
force comprised of UNC faculty, staff, and students began meeting to
discuss possible revisions.9

3. See, e.g., Max Berry, Letter to the Editor, Psalm 100 Must Eject Women Members
at 12, available at
Too, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Sept. 2, 2011,
http:/Iwww.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2011/09/psalm 100_musteject womenme
mberstoo; Andrew Brown, Letter to the Editor, Psalm 100 Was Right to Uphold Its
Beliefs, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Aug. 31, 2011, at 8, available at
http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.phplarticle/2011/08/psalm_100_was-right_to_upholdit
s beliefs; Daniel Fenton, Letter to the Editor, Psalm 100 Has a Right to Maintain Its Own
at 8, available at
Views, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Oct. 19, 2011,
http://www.dailytarheel.comlindex.php/article/2011/10/psalm_100_has_a-rightto .maintai
n-itsown views; Michael Gee, Letter to the Editor, Consider All Members' Beliefs in
Psalm 100, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Oct. 26, 2011, at 8, available at
http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2011/10/considerall_membersbeliefsin_p
salm_100; Scott Neidich, Letter to the Editor, Psalm 100 Should Rewrite Constitution,THE
at
at
12,
available
1,
2011,
HEEL,
Sept.
TAR
DAILY
http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2011/09/psalml-100.should rewrite-constitution.
4. Jamie Gnazzo, Panel Discusses Psalm 100, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Sept. 28, 2011,
at 7, available at http://www.dailytarheel.comlindex.php/article/2011/09/unc-first.
amendment daypanel-discusses-psalm_100.
5. Paula Seligson, UNC Will Look into Christian Group, THE DAILY TAR HEEL,
Aug. 31, 2011, at 1, availableat http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2011/08
/uncwill-lookintochristian-group.
6. Andy Thomason, Psalm 100 ClearedAfter Investigation, THE DAILY TAR HEEL,
Oct. 17, 2011, at 1, availableat http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2011/10/unc
clears psalm_100 after investigation. For the full text of the University's policy, see The
University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill Official Recognition of Student Organizations:
Non-DiscriminationPolicy, U.N.C. CHAPEL HILL, http://www.unc.edulcampus/policies

/studentorgnondiscrim.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
7. Ripe for Revision, THE DAILY TAR HEEL, Oct. 18, 2011, at 8, available at
http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php/article/2011/10/ripe for_revision-the-psalm 100_r
uling_calls fortighter_1anguagein the_discriminationpolicy.
8. Alpha Iota Omega v. Moeser, No. 1:04CV00765, 2006 WL 1286186, at *2-3
(M.D.N.C. May 4,2006).
9. Hailey Vest, Non-Discrimination Policy Task Force to Meet, THE DAILY TAR
HEEL, Jan. 24, 2012, at 3, available at http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.phplarticle/2012
/01/nondiscrimination-policy-taskforce tobegin-meetingnext week. The author of
this Comment was a member of this task force.
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Litigation pitting public university NDPs against students' First
Amendment rights is a recent phenomenon in the federal courts.10 In
the short time since these cases first started appearing in the mid2000s, the number of cases in federal courts challenging the NDPs of
various public universities has increased precipitously." The legality
and propriety of NDPs has taken center stage in a larger national
debate regarding the proper balance between goals of diversity, equal
access, and nondiscrimination on one hand, and First Amendment
freedoms on the other.' 2 The only instance in which the United States
Supreme Court has addressed NDPs in the context of public
universities was in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez." The Court
found the University of California Hastings School of Law's "all
comers" policy-a policy in which no student group may discriminate
10. See generally Alpha Iota Omega, 2006 WL 1286186 (involving the University of
North Carolina's rejection of a Christian fraternity based on its desire to restrict
membership on religious beliefs).
11. See generally Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (addressing
the University of California Hastings College of Law's denial of recognition for the
Christian Legal Society); Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving
San Diego State University's denial of recognition for multiple Christian student
organizations), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012); Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi
Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp. 2d 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dealing with City
University of New York's denial of recognition to a Jewish fraternity), vacated, 502 F.3d
136 (2d Cir. 2007); Bryn Carmichael, UNCG Student Group Drops Lawsuit, Says It
Welcomes All Students, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), May 25, 2012, at A15
(discussing the settlement reached between the University of North Carolina at
Greensboro ("UNCG") and a religious student organization after the group sued over the
university's refusal to grant official recognition based on an alleged violation of UNCG's
NDP). The courts have seen challenges to nondiscrimination policies at the high school
level as well. See, e.g., Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2008)
(addressing the refusal of the public school system in Kent County, Washington to allow a
high school Bible club), overruled on othergrounds by L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct.
447 (2010); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 848 (2d Cir. 1996) (regarding
the refusal of the Roslyn Union Free School District in New York to officially recognize a
student Bible club that required club officers be Christians).
12. See D.A. CARSON, THE INTOLERANCE OF TOLERANCE 83 (2012); Richard W.
Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO
RELIGIOUS PRACTICES INTHE UNITED STATES 194, 195 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); Martha
Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Law?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781,
787 (2007) ("[P]lural goods can and do clash. Ensuring equal respect along lines of race,
sex, and sexual orientation can conflict with protection of religious freedom."); see, e.g.,
Blake Farmer, Vanderbilt Rule Rankles Faith-BasedStudent Groups, NPR (Mar. 22,2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/22/149141095/vanderbilt-rule-rankles-faith-based-studentgroups; Religious Liberty in Universities, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM,
(last visited
http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/issues/public-education/university
Nov. 14, 2012); What Does Christian Legal Society v. Martinez Tell Us About University
Nondiscrimination Policies?, ACLU (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rightsreligion-belief/what-does-emchristian-legal-society-v-martinezem-tell-us-about.
13. 130 S. Ct. at 2978-79.

2012]

NONDISCRIMINATION POLICIES

283

against anyone for any reason-constitutional.14 The Court's narrow
holding, however, left significant questions unanswered."
Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed'6 is the most recent addition to the
jurisprudence addressing NDPs in public university student
organization programs. In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the next logical question
after Martinez: If an "all comers" policy is constitutionally valid, what
of a nondiscrimination policy that only prohibits discrimination on
specific classifications such as religion or race?" Pursuant to the
standard test for speech restrictions in limited public forums," the
court found no facial violations after reviewing the policy for
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.19 However, the court's
opinion suffers significant legal problems in its application of First
Amendment principles, logical problems in the way it conceptualizes
NDPs, and practical problems for those who must implement the
holding. As such, this Comment argues for several conceptual and
practical changes in the way that public universities typically conceive
of and implement their nondiscrimination policies for student
organization programs.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Alpha Delta Chi. Part II discusses several relevant
areas of law that, in light of the paucity of specifically applicable legal
precedent, should guide the thinking of those seeking to promote
nondiscrimination principles within the constraints mandated by the
First Amendment. Part III employs Part II's analysis to identify three
categories of deficiencies within the Ninth Circuit's opinion: legal
problems, conceptual problems, and practical problems. Finally, Part
IV suggests a balanced approach for the future that fosters strong
expressive rights on campus by designing policies that distinguish
wrongful discrimination from non-wrongful discrimination and
provide clear procedural mechanisms for enforcing such policies in
transparent and consistent ways.

14. Id. at 2984 ("This opinion... considers only whether conditioning access to a
student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy violates the
Constitution.").
15. Id.; see also infra Part II.A.
16. 648 F.3d 790.
17. Id. at 795.
18. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
19. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 804.
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I. ALPHA DELTA CHI V. REED

The Lead-Up to the Ninth Circuit's Opinion
At the time of litigation, the NDP governing San Diego State
University's ("SDSU") student organization program was very
similar to those applied to student organizations by many universities
across the United States.2 0 The policy stipulated:
On-campus status will not be granted to any student
organization whose application ... restricts membership or
eligibility to hold appointed or elected student officer position
in the campus-recognized chapter or group on the basis of race,
sex, color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual
orientation, physical or mental handicap, ancestry, or medical
condition, except as explicitly exempted under federal law. 2

A.

Each student group was required to affirm compliance with this
statement each year when it reapplied for official status.22 Failure to
obtain official status resulted in the forfeiture of benefits, including
access to university facilities and student fees, use of the university's
name and logo, free publicity in school publications, and participation
in student activity fairs.23 Fraternities and sororities in violation of the
policy forfeited participation in the university's Greek councils that
provide leadership training, social activities, and additional recruiting
opportunities.2 4 Essentially, SDSU's student organization program
acted as a gatekeeper to the tools and services that are essential for a
student organization to effectively participate in campus life, such
that failure to gain recognition could mean the difference between a
group's life and death.2 5
20. See, e.g., UCLA, GENERAL CATALOG 2012-13, at 661-62 (2012),
UNIV.
http://www.registrar.uca.edu/archive/catalog/2012-13/uclageneralcatalogl2-13.pdf;
OF N.C., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL POLICY STATEMENT ON
http://www.unc.edulcampus/policies/nondiscrim.pdf;
(2012),
NON-DISCRIMINATION
Handbook of Operating Procedures 3-3020: Nondiscrimination Policy, U. OF TEX. AT
AUSTIN U. POL'Y OFF., http://policies.utexas.edu/policies/nondiscrimination-policy (last
MICH.,
OF
U.
Nondiscrimination Policy,
2012);
14,
Oct.
visited
http://www.umich.edu/policy-nondescrim.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2012); University
Statement on Equal Opportunity, JOHNS HOPKINS U., http://webapps.jhu.edu/jhuniverse
/administration/minutespoliciereports/policies/equal-opportunity/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2012).
21. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 796.
22. Id. at 795.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 796.
25. See John D. Inazu, The Unsettling "Well-Settled" Law of Freedom of Association,
43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 197 (2010); see also Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless:
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Prior to litigation, Alpha Delta Chi and Alpha Gamma Omega, a
Christian sorority and fraternity, respectively, had applied to SDSU
for official recognition for several years. 6 SDSU repeatedly denied
the groups' applications, stating that the organizations' religious
requirements of its leaders and members violated the university's
NDP.27 Alpha Delta Chi required of its members "personal
acceptance of Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior," "active participation
in Christian service," and "regular attendance or membership in an
evangelical church." 28 Alpha Gamma Omega required that its
officers' beliefs and practices be "consistent with orthodox Christian
beliefs" and that they sign the following faith statement:
I hereby publicly confess my belief in the Lord Jesus Christ as
God and only Savior and give witness to the regenerating
power of the Holy Spirit in my life. I will make it a purpose of
my life to continue in fellowship with God through prayer and
reading of the Holy Scriptures.29
Members of Alpha Gamma Omega were held to lower, yet still
restrictive standards. 0
As a result of SDSU's repeated denials of their applications, the
groups forfeited the benefits listed above and thus suffered secondclass status on campus, being required to pay full price to rent
university facilities and restricted in the areas in which they could
recruit members.3 1 As a result, the groups filed suit, arguing that the
NDP violated the students' rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.3 2 The district court granted summary judgment to the
university,3 3 and the student groups appealed to the Ninth Circuit."
Public University Antidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations, 118
HARV. L. REv, 2882, 2903 (2005) ("Universities that have refused to grant explicit
exemptions to religious clubs have used religion and sexual orientation antidiscrimination
requirements like a sword of Damocles dangling precipitously over a religious club's
recognition. Many universities have withdrawn official recognition only to reinstate it later
after public outcry, negotiation, or litigation-sometimes maintaining that their position
was consistent throughout." (citations omitted)).
26. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 795-96.
27. Id. at 796.
28. Id. at 795.
29. Id.
30. Id. Members must "sincerely want to know Jesus Christ as their Lord and Savior."
Id.
31. Id. at 796.
32. Every Nation Campus Ministries v. Achtenberg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1079 (S.D.
Cal. 2009), rev'd in part sub nom. Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
33. Id. at 1100.
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The Ninth CircuitDecision
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court acknowledged that the
plaintiffs' claims presented a question currently unanswered by legal
precedent." The policy at issue in Alpha Delta Chi pertained to the
blanket prohibition on a student group's ability to selectively choose
members based on certain attributes such as religion, gender, race,
and sexual orientation.36 The student groups argued that this policy
violated their First Amendment rights in three ways. First, the groups
argued that SDSU's NDP had the effect of compelling the admission
of members to an expressive association, thus violating First
Amendment rights to expressive association.37 Similarly, the groups
argued that the university's denial of official recognition violated
their free speech rights under the First Amendment because it
"excluded them from an expressive forum" based on their religious
viewpoint." Finally, the groups claimed that the university's conduct
targeted the students' religious viewpoints in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.39 The Ninth Circuit held that the university's policy,
as written, was viewpoint neutral, thus undermining the First
Amendment theories underlying all three claims.4 0 As such, the court
held that SDSU's policy, and by extension all policies like it, was "not
materially different from the content-neutral all-comers policy
approved in ChristianLegal Society v. Martinez, and must be similarly
upheld against First Amendment challenge. "41
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by attempting to apply
Martinez's treatment of NDPs to the circumstances before the court.4 2
As the plaintiffs' claims invoked fundamental speech rights, the
court's first task was to classify SDSU's student organization
B.

34. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 796. At the district court, the fraternity and sorority
were joined by two additional student organizations at California State University Long
Beach. Those groups did not join Alpha Delta and Alpha Gamma's appeal. Id. at 795 n.1.
35. See id. at 795 (referencing Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978
(2010)). In reality, the UC Hastings NDP on its face resembled the SDSU policy.
However, a muddled record, including stipulations by both sides that the policy was an allcomers policy, led the court to restrict its analysis in this manner. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
at 2984. Therefore, the holding in Martinez is not controlling in cases like Alpha Delta Chi.
Discussion of ChristianLegal Society v. Martinez occurs in greater detail infra in Part II.A.
36. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 796.
37. Id. at 796-97.
38. Id. at 797.
39. Id, at 804.
40. Id. at 803. The court did hold, however, that SDSU's NDP as applied may have
singled out these student groups and remanded for additional fact finding on this point. Id.
at 803-04.
41. Id. at 803 (citing Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)).
42. Id. at 797.
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program.43 Whereas Martinez stipulated that a public law school's
student organization program was a "limited public forum," the
plaintiffs in Alpha Delta Chi argued that the program was a
"designated public forum," which would require the court to apply
strict scrutiny analysis to any restrictions that the university placed on
student speech." The Ninth Circuit found "no material distinction"
between UC Hastings' program 5 and SDSU's program, and thus
found SDSU's program to be a limited public forum. 6 As such,
judicial scrutiny of SDSU's restrictions on the forum asked whether
the restriction was "(1) reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum; and (2) viewpoint neutral."'
Accordingly, the court first asked whether the SDSU's NDP was
reasonable in light of the university's purpose for the student
organization program." To answer this question, the court reviewed
the university's student handbook and found diversity and
nondiscrimination to be central purposes of the student organization
program. 49 The court deferred strongly and uncritically to the
university's asserted pedagogical goals and agreed that the NDP was
a reasonable means of accomplishing those goals. 0 Further, the court
found the policy reasonable based on evidence that the groups had
alternative means of expression on campus, such as access to social
media and the ability to distribute literature.
The court next inquired as to whether the university's NDP was
viewpoint neutral.5 2 The court began by noting that a restriction on
43. Id.
44. Id. First Amendment jurisprudence allows government actors to limit the freedom
of speech on government owned property to varying degrees based on the nature of the
property in question. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED
STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 601 (4th ed. 2011). "Designated
public forums" are forums for speech that the government has established for the purpose
of facilitating free expression in the same way that places like parks and sidewalks have
traditionally been understood to be. Id. Restrictions on speech in these forums are subject
to strict scrutiny analysis by the courts. Id. "Limited public forums" are forums that the
government has opened up for certain types of speech, such as student speech. Id.
Restrictions on speech in these forums must only be reasonable, but must still be
viewpoint-neutral. Id.
45. UC Hastings School of Law was the university in question in Martinez, 130 S. Ct.
at 2978.
46. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 797.
47. Id. at 798. The court cited Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995), as its support for this test. Id. at 797.
48. Id. at 798.
49. Id. at 799.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 800.
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speech is unconstitutional if it is motivated by a purpose to suppress
expression.13 However, a restriction may be permissible when it is
"viewpoint neutral," meaning that it " 'serves purposes unrelated to
the content of expression,' and only 'incidentally burdens some
speakers, messages, or viewpoints.' "" The plaintiffs argued that
because SDSU's NDP targeted only some types of discrimination,
unlike the policy in Martinez that prohibited all types of
discrimination, the policy impermissibly targeted certain types of
discriminatory content or expression." More specifically, the
plaintiffs argued that the policy discriminated against religiouslybased membership restrictions, such as a Christian organization
excluding Muslims, while allowing non-religious membership
restrictions, such as a collegiate Republicans group excluding
Democrats. 6 Accordingly, the court assessed the University's
purpose for imposing the NDP."
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument on several grounds.
Primarily, the court held that while the policy may have had the
incidental effect of burdening religious groups, the purpose of the
university's policy was to promote nondiscrimination and equal
opportunity for students. 8 The court stated that "[a]s the Supreme
Court has made clear, antidiscrimination laws intended to ensure
equal access to the benefits of society serve goals 'unrelated to the
suppression of expression' and are neutral as to both content and
viewpoint." 9 To support its holding, the court referenced its decision
in Truth v. Kent School District,6 0 where the court upheld a public
high school's denial of recognition to a student group seeking to
restrict membership based on adherence to a religious statement.'
Here the court concluded that "the school's denying the plaintiff
student group access to the student organization program was based
on [the student group's] discriminatory membership criteria and not
the religious 'content of the speech.' "62 Finally, the court found a
53.
(1983)).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59,
Hurley
60.

Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
Id. (quoting Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2994 (2010)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1984) and citing
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)).
542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cnty. v.

Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010).

61. Id. at 648.
62. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 802.
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distinction between forcing an expressive association to admit
members and conditioning the benefits of official recognition on
adherence to the NDP. 6 Because SDSU did not compel the
admission of members into either group, the court held that SDSU's
NDP did not violate Supreme Court precedent in cases such as Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale' and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston.65 As such, the court concluded
that SDSU's NDP was viewpoint neutral on its face and ultimately
held against the plaintiffs on all counts.66
II. THE LAW RELEVANT TO UNIVERSITY NONDISCRIMINATION
POLICIES

Despite the precipitous increase in litigation over the issue of
NDPs and expressive association, the Supreme Court precedent
pertaining specifically to NDPs in public universities is sparse.6 As
such, this Part will begin by assessing how Martinez, the only
Supreme Court case on point, and ChristianLegal Society v. Walker,'
the only other case on point to reach the federal appellate courts,
relate to the facts and arguments presented in Alpha Delta Chi. Then,
in light of the paucity of precedent directly addressing this issue, this
Part will proceed to explore how issues of fact and law similar to
63. Id. at 802-03.
64. 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (holding that a New Jersey state law compelling a private
association, the Boy Scouts of America, to retain a scoutmaster who did not agree with the
group's stance on homosexuality was a violation of First Amendment because it was a
"severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association").
65. 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995) (holding that a Massachusetts state law forcing the
South Boston Allied War Veterans Counsel to admit the Irish American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group of Boston to its parade, even though the parade organizers did not
agree with the group's message, violated the organizers' First Amendment rights to the
"autonomy to choose the content of [their] own message").
66. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 803. The court also addressed two other issues
presented by the plaintiffs. Primarily, despite the facial validity of the policy, the court
recognized that there was evidence that the university had permitted both religious and
non-religious groups to gain official recognition despite apparent discriminatory
membership restrictions. As such, the court found that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment on this matter and remanded. Id. at 804. Finally, the court addressed
the plaintiffs' claims that SDSU had targeted their religious beliefs in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The court found that SDSU's policy was facially neutral
because of its general applicability, but it remanded the case because summary judgment
was inappropriate given possible evidence that the policy had been applied only to
religious groups. Id. at 804-05. While each of these issues is a fertile ground for discussion,
this Comment will focus primarily on legal and theoretical issues in the court's treatment
of the reasonableness and neutrality of SDSU's policy on its face.
67. See id. at 805 (Ripple, J., concurring) ("[T]his case presents an important issue of
First Amendment jurisprudence, which ... is still an open question at the national level.").
68. 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
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those in Alpha Delta Chi have arisen in other Supreme Court cases.
Ultimately, this Section will set the stage for Part III's discussion of
how the Ninth Circuit's decision deviates from the traditional
trajectory of cases addressing the conflict of students' expressive
rights and university regulation.
A.

Legal Precedent Specific to NDPs
Precedent in the federal appellate courts dealing directly with
NDPs at public universities is sparse. As noted above, First
Amendment challenges on these grounds are a fairly recent
phenomenon." The only case on these issues to have reached the
United States Supreme Court was Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
in 2010.0 While the case certainly offers guidance, its applicability is
narrow because the way that the Court framed the NDP, as an "all
comers" policy, precludes many NDPs in effect around the country
that are more limited in scope. The only other case to have reached
the federal appellate level prior to Alpha Delta Chi was Christian
Legal Society v. Walker, a 2006 case in the Seventh Circuit.
The factual circumstances giving rise to Martinez were very
similar to those in Alpha Delta Chi. The local chapter of the Christian
Legal Society ("CLS") at the University of California Hastings
College of Law sought to require its members and leaders to sign a
"Statement of Faith" as required by the national parent CLS
organization.72 The "Statement of Faith" included a stipulation that
signatories adhere to traditional notions of Christian sexual morality,
a stipulation that UC Hastings decided conflicted with its
nondiscrimination policy.73 The university repeatedly denied CLS
official recognition, meaning that CLS would forego significant
benefits accompanying status as a recognized student organization. 4
As such, CLS brought suit in federal court claiming violations of First
Amendment protections for speech, expressive association, and
exercise of religion, and ultimately ended up before the Supreme
Court."
The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of UC Hastings.
Ultimately, the Court found the restriction to be reasonable under
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
453 F.3d 853.
See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.
See id.
Id. at 2979-81.
Id. at 2981.
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the limited public forum test for several reasons.76 First, the policy
succeeded in addressing legitimate pedagogical concerns of the
University, avoided a conceptually suspect and practically difficult
requirement that the University decipher between discrimination
based on belief and status,77 and adequately sought to comply with
relevant state law. 8 Second, the policy did not preclude groups like
CLS from pursuing alternate methods of interacting or
communicating with the campus. 9 Finally, in response to CLS's
assertions that the policy was "frankly absurd," the Court noted that
the restrictions imposed by the University need not be advisable, but
merely constitutionally permissible."o
As for viewpoint neutrality, the Court distinguished UC
Hastings' policy from other related precedents in which the Court
ruled against universities on First Amendment grounds by noting that
UC Hastings' actions did not single out an individual group for
reasons of its message or viewpoint.8' The Court strongly rejected
76. Id. at 2988-93.
77. The distinction between "status" and "belief" in a university NDP first appears in
a 2005 case at UNC. Alpha Iota Omega v. Moeser, No. 1:04CV00765, 2006 WL 1286186, at
*2 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2006). The facts of this case mirror those of Alpha Delta Chi and
Martinez. Id. On the case's second trip to the federal district court, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's claims after UNC revised its policy to allow discrimination based on religious
belief, but not discrimination based on religious status. Id. at *5. Discrimination based on
religious belief was valid, the court concluded, because organizations had a compelling
interest in guarding their ideological commitments and goals. Id. Discrimination based on
religious status, or perceived religious status, by contrast, was not related to the goal of
preserving an ideological message and thus was impermissible. Id. This concept has also
arisen in the context of religious employment. See generally Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes
for Children, 186 F. Supp. 2d 757 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (addressing a discrimination and First
Amendment claim from a former employee of Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children who
had been discharged because of her sexual orientation). One commentator on the Pedreira
case asked whether the employee's termination was "based upon her sexual orientation or
... her being unable to uphold the religious mission or principles of her employer?" AMY
E. BLACK ET AL., OF LITTLE FAITH: THE POLITICS OF GEORGE W. BUSH'S FAITHBASED INITIATIVES 258 (2004). The opinion, however, provides little guidance on who
makes this distinction and how they do it. Accordingly, this distinction has been strongly
criticized in cases such as Martinez. 130 S. Ct. at 2976 ("CLS's proposal that Hastings
permit exclusion because of beliefbut forbid discrimination due to status would impose on
Hastings the daunting task of trying to determine whether a student organization cloaked
prohibited status exclusion in belief-based garb.").
78. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989-91.
79. Id. at 2991. The Court noted that CLS could still make some use of the school's
facilities and bulletin boards, in addition to publicly available online forms of
communication such as Google and Yahoo!. Id.
80. Id. at 2992. CLS had asserted that "[tihere can be no diversity of viewpoints in a
forum ... if groups are not permitted to form around viewpoints." Id. (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 50, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)).
81. Id. at 2993. For discussions of these other cases, see infra Part III.B.
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CLS's argument that the discriminatory effect of the policy was
"vulnerable to constitutional assault," because the effect was merely
incidental to the actual purpose of the policy and generally applicable
to all student organizations.82 Yet this element of the opinion
significantly narrows its applicability as well. The Court interpreted
UC-Hastings' NDP to be an "all-comers" policy, meaning that all
recognized organizations must "allow any student to participate,
become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization,
regardless of [her] status or beliefs."" In explicitly limiting the
applicability of its decision to "all-comers" policies, the Court left in
doubt the constitutionality of more narrowly tailored NDPs that
permit some bases for discrimination but not others. Because many of
the NDPs at universities are the more narrow form of NDP,"
Martinez's applicability to disputes such as the one in Alpha Delta Chi
is imprecise and uncertain.
The only other federal appellate case dealing with NDPs in
public universities is Walker, a 2006 case in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.' The factual circumstances are
practically indistinguishable from both Alpha Delta Chi and Martinez.
Administrators at Southern Illinois University's ("SIU") law school
revoked the official status of the local student chapter of the Christian
Legal Society because the group's Statement of Faith conflicted with
two university policies with nondiscrimination implications-costing
the group access to the benefits necessary to exist on campus.
Despite the factual similarities, the case was before the Seventh
Circuit on procedural grounds regarding the district court's denial of
an injunction for CLS. 7 The court did not issue any holding on the
merits but, pursuant to the standard of review for injunctions,
reviewed the record to decide whether CLS had sufficiently
demonstrated that it would succeed on the merits." Due to the
unprecedented nature of the issues in the federal courts, the court did
not decide, or see the need to decide, what type of NDP was at issue.
The Seventh Circuit's treatment of the issues differs significantly from
the analyses in Alpha Delta Chi and Martinez. However, many of the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2994-95.
Id. at 2979 n.5.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 858.
See id. at 858-59.
Id. at 859-76.
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same issues arise in the Seventh Circuit's opinion and thus prove
helpful in assessing both Martinez and Alpha Delta Chi.
The Seventh Circuit's holding did not reach the merits, but its
treatment of CLS's claims demonstrates a much more sympathetic
tone to the expressive rights of the private entity subjected to speech
restrictions. First, the court noted that CLS's Statement of Faith-the
same as the one at issue in Martinez-did not necessarily violate
SIU's NDP merely because it denied those who engaged in or
condoned homosexual conduct the ability to pursue leadership
positions.89 Rather, the policy would deny leadership status to anyone
who advocated or engaged in sexual conduct outside of traditional
marriage, including "fornication [and] adultery," whether
heterosexual or homosexual.o Thus, contrary to SIU's assertions,
CLS's policy could not be said to be unfairly discriminating solely on
the basis of sexual orientation." Second, the court inquired as to
whether enforcing SIU's policy on CLS would infringe upon the
group's rights regarding expressive association.92 In stark contrast to
the Ninth Circuit's treatment in Alpha Delta Chi,9' the Seventh
Circuit understood that allowing SIU to enforce the policy with
respect to CLS would "forc[e] it to accept as members those who
engage [in conduct antithetical to the Statement of Faith]," "impair its
ability to express disapproval of active homosexuality," and "cause
the group as it currently identifies itself to cease to exist."' Significant
to this part of the court's analysis was the fact that SIU had not
proffered any government interest in enforcing the policy. In both
Martinez and Alpha Delta Chi, the universities proffered pedagogical
interests to justify the restrictions they had placed on expressive
associations.96 Yet even had SIU asserted interests in enforcing the
restriction on CLS's expressive rights, the Seventh Circuit seemed
highly skeptical of the validity of such interests, both in the way that it
questioned whether SIU could have any interest in "forcing CLS to
accept members whose activities violate its creed other than

89. See id. at 860.
90. Id.
91. Id&
92. Id. at 862-63.
93. Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 802 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1743 (2012).
94. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.
95. Id.
96. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2989-91 (2010); Alpha
Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 802.
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eradicating or neutralizing particular beliefs,"' and the fact that it
found CLS's interests to be "unquestionably substantial." 98
B. FirstAmendment Rights at Public Universities
In light of the insightful yet incomplete guidance provided by
Martinez, deciphering the proper principles to apply in a case like
Alpha Delta Chi requires evaluating precedent in several other
instances in which public universities have been sued by students on
First Amendment grounds. Over the past three decades, a diverse
variety of university regulations on students' expressive rights has
come before the Supreme Court under the Speech Clause and the
Religion Clause. Prior to Martinez, all of the cases ruled in favor of
the students.
In Widmar v. Vincent," the University of Missouri at Kansas City
prohibited a religious student group from continuing to hold meetings
in facilities owned by the university."oo The university asserted its
concern that facilitating or accommodating religious student groups
would violate First Amendment prohibitions on grounds of
''excessive . . . entanglement" between government actors and
religious practice.10' Rebuffing that rationale, the Court stated that
the university was wrong to conceptualize "allowing religious groups
to share the limited public forum" as having "the 'primary effect' of
advancing religion." 0 2 The Court explained that "incidental" benefits
to student groups did not violate the Establishment Clause in a forum
open to all groups. 0 It reasoned that the "policy 'would no more
commit the University ... to religious goals' than it is 'now committed
to the goals of the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young
Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to use its facilities.""
Similarly, in Rosenberger v. Regents and Visitors of University of
Virginia,o"a student group organized to publish a Christian magazine
on campus brought suit in federal court for various First Amendment
claims after the University of Virginia ("UVA") withheld student

97. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863.
98. Id. at 863-64.
99. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
100. Id. at 265.
101. Id. at 270-71. For a discussion of "excessive entanglement," see Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664,674-75 (1970).
102. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272.
103. Id. at 273.
104. Id. at 274 (citing Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980)).
105. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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funding because of the magazine's religious viewpoint. 106 The
University argued that distributing funds to a Christian group would
violate the Establishment Clause by "send[ing] an unmistakably clear
signal that the University of Virginia supports Christian values and
wishes to promote the wide promulgation of such values."" 7 The
Court rejected this argument, finding that UVA's program was
neutral toward religion and did not have the purpose of aiding
religious causes. 08 The funds offered by the student activity fund
were not extracted to support a religious group, but rather to support
"wide-ranging speech and .. . student expression [that] is an integral
part of the university's educational mission."109 The Court held that
"[a]ny benefit to religion is incidental to the government's provision
of secular services for secular purposes on a religion-neutral basis.""o
Further, the Court criticized the dissent's argument that the university
should be prohibited from any association with religious expression.
It noted that such a requirement would "eventual[ly] raise[] the
specter of governmental censorship, to ensure that all student writings
and publications meet some baseline standard of secular orthodoxy,"
having the effect of "imperil[ling] the very sources of free speech and
expression.""
The plaintiffs in Rosenberger also claimed violations of speech
rights.112 With regard to these claims, the Court noted that because
the university's limited public forum provided access to funding for all
student journalism organizations,"' the university could not
discriminate based on the viewpoint of an individual organization."'
In addition, the Court drew an important distinction regarding the
106. Id. at 827. The university made this decision despite a prior designation of the
group as one eligible for access to student funds. Id. at 826.
107. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 286 (4th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 515 U.S. 819. By the time litigation reached the Supreme Court, the University had
abandoned its defense of this issue, but the Supreme Court addressed it because the
Fourth Circuit had based its judgment on the issue and the Supreme Court's dissenting
opinions would have upheld the Fourth Circuit on this matter. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
838.
108. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 843-44.
111. Id. at 844-45.
112. Id. at 827.
113. The court noted that a student organization program is "a forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable."
Id. at 830.
114. Id. at 831 ("[Tlhe University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but
selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints.").
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government actor's relationship to the speech. A government entity is
permitted to discriminate and control speech when the message is its
own."' However, "[i]t does not follow... that viewpoint-based
restrictions are proper when the university does not itself speak or
subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds
to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.""'
Therefore, when the government itself is not the originator of the
speech, but rather funds and facilitates the message of private actors
within a limited forum, the government is not able to decide whether
speakers are allowed to participate based upon their viewpoints as
private actors."' In other words, if the university chooses to subsidize
some student speech, it must subsidize all of it."s
In 2000, the Supreme Court, in Board of Regents of University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth,"'9 reaffirmed the importance of
student free speech and viewpoint neutrality in the way that the
university allocated resources to groups. The plaintiffs were students
who argued that a mandatory fee used to fund the student
organization program violated their First Amendment rights by
essentially forcing them to fund groups whose ideological beliefs and
practices were antithetical to their own.'20 The Court recognized and
validated these interests, yet also recognized the university's
"important and substantial purpose ... [of] facilitat[ing] a wide range

of speech.""' To balance these interests, the Court reasoned that the
mandatory fees could be constitutional as long as they were allocated
to student organizations in a viewpoint neutral manner. 22 The Court
noted, "There is symmetry then in our holding here and in
Rosenberger:Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the
student to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the

115. Id. at 833 ("When the government disburses public funds to private entities to
convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure
that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.").
116. Id. at 834.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 837.
119. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
120. Id. at 226-27.
121. Id. at 231.
122. Id. at 233. The Court's only qualm in holding for the university was evidence in
the record that fee allocation was subject to a majority voting referendum. Id. at 235. The
Court held that this method would be constitutionally impermissible if it effectively
undermined viewpoint neutrality. Id. Due to unclear evidence in the record on this issue,
the Court remanded this issue to the district court for resolution. Id. at 235-36.
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integrity of the program's operation once the funds have been
collected.""'
Thus, under the banner of Widmar, Rosenberger, and
Southworth, students enjoy significant legal protection for expressive
speech and activity under both the Speech Clause and the
Establishment Clause. Martinez seems to depart from the trajectory
of these cases. However, it remains to be seen whether its
precedential value will be cabined to true "all-comers" policies or
whether it is representative of a broader exception when
nondiscrimination norms are at stake.
C. Rights Pertinentto Group Autonomy
First Amendment precedent regarding group autonomy outside
the university is also pertinent to assessing NDPs in public
universities. The legal theory underlying Alpha Delta Chi's free
speech claims against SDSU centers upon the notion that restricting
the means by which a group of students selects its members or leaders
essentially handicaps the group's ability to control the message that it
sends to the campus.12 4 As such, one applicable area of law for
assessing the Ninth Circuit's handling of the case is the freedom of
expressive association. Although not explicit in the Constitution,
expressive association is a fundamental right derived from the First
Amendment right to the freedom of speech.'2 5 The Supreme Court
first recognized this right in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 6
stating that "[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." 27
Although technically vested in individuals, the right functionally
operates as the right of freedom of speech on a group level: the right
of a group to engage in free expression of beliefs and ideas, based on
the aggregated speech rights of the group's individuals. The right is
123. Id. at 233.
124. Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1743 (2012).
125. See, e.g., NAACP v. Ala. ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958).
126. 357 U.S. 449.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Inazu, supra note 25, at 155; see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 735
(9th ed. 2009) (defining expressive association as "[t]he constitutional right of an
individual to associate with others, without undue government interference, for the
purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, such as speech,
assembly, and the exercise of religion").
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strongly connected to free speech, and thus it typically enjoys great
deference from courts in the form of strict scrutiny. 12 9 The rationale
for this deference is clear: expressive association is "an indispensable
means of preserving other individual liberties" such as "speech,
assembly, ... and the exercise of religion."130
A frequent basis for litigation regarding the right of expressive
association, and a central concern regarding NDPs at public
universities, involves group membership. The Court has stated that
"[f]reedom of association . .. plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.""' The Court first spoke to this issue in Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees,"2 where it noted that government intrusion into the "internal
organization or affairs of [a] group" can be an unconstitutional
infringement on the right to association." Ultimately, the Court
upheld a Minnesota statute that effectively forced a local civic
organization to admit female members, but it only did so after finding
that there was no evidence to show that the forced inclusion of
women would hinder the group's desired expression. 134
More recently, the Court affirmed this principle in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale,t 35 where an adult leader brought a claim under a
state law against the Boy Scouts of America for excluding his
participation on the basis of his homosexuality. 136 Citing Jaycees, the
Court upheld the Boy Scouts' freedom to exclude Dale13 :

129. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (explaining that, in
addition to explicitly protected activities, the First Amendment contains an
"implicit ... corresponding right" to "associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety
of... ends" (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,622 (1984)); NAACP, 357 U.S.
at 460-61 ("[SJtate action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate
is subject to the closest scrutiny."); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 861 (7th
Cir. 2006) ("Infringements on expressive association are subject to strict scrutiny."). But
see Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 ("The right to associate for expressive purposes is not
... absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."); Truth v. Kent Sch.
Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 652 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that a lesser standard of scrutiny applies to
restrictions on a group's speech within a limited public forum), overruled on othergrounds
by L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010).
130. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
131. Id. at 623.
132. 468 U.S. 609.
133. Id. at 622-23.
134. Id. at 627-28.
135. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
136. Id. at 645.
137. Id. at 656.
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This right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its
views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps
unpopular,

ideas . . . . Government

actions

that

may

unconstitutionally burden this freedom may take many
forms ... like a 'regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire.' Forcing a group to accept certain
members may impair the ability of the group to express those
views, and only those views, that it intends to express.138
The Supreme Court's treatment of partisan political primaries
provides great insight into the contours of constitutional precedent
regarding membership and freedom of expressive association.
Beginning in 1981, the Court has handed down a comprehensive
series of decisions dealing with the interaction between state laws
regulating who can participate in partisan primaries and the
associational rights of the political parties themselves."' The Court
has upheld political parties' expressive associational rights in a
number of contexts: where a party's desire for a closed primary
conflicted with state laws for open primaries;14 0 where a party's desire
for an open primary conflicted with a state law for closed primaries;
and where political parties' desires for closed primaries conflicted
138. Id. at 647-48. But see id. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]f merely joining a
group did constitute symbolic speech; and such speech were attributable to the group
being joined; and that group has the right to exclude that speech (and hence, the right to
exclude that person from joining), then the right of free speech effectively becomes a
limitless right to exclude for every organization, whether or not it engages in any
expressive activities. That cannot be, and never has been, the law.").
139. See, e.g., Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel.LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 11213 (1981). Also relevant to the nature of the right of association is the 1996 case of Duke v.
Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996). In this case, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the
Republican Party of Georgia's decision to exclude the infamous Klansman, David Duke,
from the party's presidential primary ballot, citing the parties' association rights and
finding that Duke had no right to associate with an unwilling partner. Id. at 1232.
140. See Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 112-13. Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had held under Wisconsin law that the Democratic National Committee was required to
accept to its national convention delegates elected through an open primary in which there
was no restriction on who could vote. Id. at 113. This requirement clashed with the
national party's charter, which stipulated that delegates to the National Convention be
selected through a process in which only Democrats could participate. Id. at 109. Upon
review, the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Democratic Party,
reasoning that Wisconsin's declared interests in open primaries did not trump the party's
rights to control the makeup of the party's delegation from the state. Id. at 126.
141. See Tashijan v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1986). Here, the
state Republican Party desired to open its primary to unaffiliated voters in an effort to
appeal to independent voters, but Connecticut's statutory system mandated closed
primaries, Id. at 210-11. Once again, the Supreme Court favored the party's associational
rights over the state's various interests with regards to protecting voting rights and
bolstering the integrity of the electoral system. Id. at 225.
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with a state constitutional amendment passed through public
referendum.142 The freedom of association is a proven, durable right,
capable of overcoming strong state interests. However, the courts
have curiously not extended this rationale to student groups who seek
to protect expressive freedoms by restricting membership and
participation in a manner very similar to the political parties
mentioned above.
Finally, the ministerial exception doctrine is also illustrative of
the issues at play in Alpha Delta Chi. This is a doctrine which recently
received strong affirmation through the unanimous decision in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
E.E.O.C.14 3 Generally, the ministerial exception refers to the
exemption that churches have with regard to the employment of
ministers from nondiscrimination elements in federal employment
law.'" Previously a creature of the lower federal courts, the Supreme
Court only recently gave the doctrine explicit approval, 45 holding:
The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from
appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it
from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select
their own.... [I]t is impermissible for the government to
contradict a church's determination of who can act as its
ministers. 146
Technically, the legal authority for the ministerial exception
arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
would not extend to organizations or issues falling outside the scope
of "religion."1 47 As such, it may be a helpful doctrine when litigating
142. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570-71 (2000). Here, a successful
public referendum altered the state's primary voting system so that any voter, regardless
of affiliation, was permitted to vote for any candidate. Id. at 570. Four state political
parties, the Democratic Party, Republican Party, Libertarian Party, and Peace and
Freedom Party, all had rules requiring closed primaries for electing their candidates and
thus sued on the basis that the new regulations violated the parties' First Amendment
rights of association. Id. at 571. Once again, the Supreme Court upheld the political
parties' claims, holding that California had made the state's interests and the parties' First
Amendment rights incompatible "by forcing political parties to associate with those who
do not share their beliefs." Id. at 586.
143. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
144. See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the MinisterialException, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1, 3 (2011).
145. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705 ("Until today, we have not had occasion to
consider whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is
implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.").
146. Id. at 703-04.
147. See id. at 706; see also Lund, supra note 144, at 2-3.
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with regard to religiously oriented student groups, but it would not
likely be so for expressive student groups that are religiously
indifferent. Conceptually, however, the doctrine looks very similar to
the right of expressive association. Just like its holding, the Court's
reasoning was clearly articulated:
[Mlembers of a religious group put their faith in the hands of
their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an
unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do
so ... interferes with the internal governance of the church,

depriving the church of control over the selection of those who
will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the

state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a
religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments.14 8
Thus, the same constitutional principles limiting the government's
ability to interfere with the internal affairs of expressive associations
find life in the area of religious liberty.
III. VULNERABILITIES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING

A.

Legal Issues in Alpha Delta Chi

In the context of the broad range of constitutional precedent
discussed in Part II, the vulnerabilities of the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Alpha Delta Chi begin to come into focus. Primarily, the court fails
to recognize important differences between the student organization
policies at SDSU and those in Martinez. The court's analysis
emphasizes several similarities between the programs, yet
unfortunately downplays many of the legally significant differences.14 9
The court treats the differences as mere technicalities, thus avoiding
substantive legal analysis by failing to adequately distinguish the
programs.1s0 Indeed, the differences between the programs are

noteworthy; a policy prohibiting all forms of membership restrictions
places different constraints on an organization than a policy

148. Hosanna-Tabor,132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasis added).
149. See Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 797-99 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012). These similarities include: (1) official recognition contingent upon
compliance with a series of requirements; (2) benefits restricted to officially recognized
student organizations; (3) permitting alternative means of interacting with the university
community, even for non-recognized student groups; and (4) purposes geared toward
equal access, diversity and nondiscrimination. Id.
150. See id. at 797.
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prohibiting only certain types of restrictions.'s In the former, all
groups are equally situated in their ability to be selective in their
membership.' 5 ' The latter policy, however, only hinders groups who
organize around an idea that implicates one of the specific
classifications targeted by the policy."s' Alpha Delta Chi, a religious
organization, only violated the NDP because it sought to condition
membership on religious criteria. 5 1 In Martinez, by contrast, the
group would have come under scrutiny whether its desired
membership restrictions were religious, political, or preference for
specific pizza toppings. 155
A second flaw in the court's analysis is the substantial deference
that it afforded to the pedagogical interests asserted by SDSU in
defense of its NDP.s 6 The deference afforded to pedagogical interests
at the elementary and secondary level differs significantly from that
afforded to similar interests at the university level. 1 Generally,
courts give more deference to the asserted pedagogical interests of
elementary and secondary schools because of the far greater degree
of paternalistic posture over students who are dependent on adult
provision and protection and whose attendance is mandatory. 5 1
Universities, on the other hand, receive less deference, especially

151. Note that while the student organization programs at the respective institutions
may look similar both in form and substance, the student group in Martinez stipulated that
its policy was an "all-comers" rule while the groups in Alpha Delta Chi did not. See supra
note 14 and accompanying text (defining "all-comers" policies).
152. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2979 (2010).
153. See Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 795.
154. Id. at 796.
155. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
156. The court found that SDSU exerted strong pedagogical goals of promoting
diversity and nondiscrimination. Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 798-99.
157. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[Tlhere is a
difference between the extent that a school may regulate student speech in a public
university setting as opposed to that of a public elementary or high school.").
158. See, e.g., id. at 316 ("[W]e keep in mind that Temple's administrators are granted
less leeway in regulating student speech than are public elementary or high school
administrators."); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
("[T]he education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers,
and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges." (citing Bd. of Educ. of
Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)));
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 509 (1969) (holding that
grade school administrators could, under certain circumstances, justify infringements of
particular types of expression based on the Court's repeated emphasis on the "need for
affirming the comprehensive authority of... school officials... to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools").
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when First Amendment rights are implicated,"s' in part because
university students are independent adults whose attendance is
voluntary and geared toward self-expression and exploration.o60
These principles are stated explicitly in McCauley v. University of the
Virgin Islands6 1:
Public university administrators are granted less leeway in
regulated student speech than are public elementary or high
school administrators. . .. We reach this conclusion in light of

the differing pedagogical goals of each institution, the in loco
parentis role of public elementary and high school
administrators, the special needs of school discipline in public
elementary and high schools, the maturity of the students, and,
finally, the fact that many university students reside on campus
and thus are subject to university rules at almost all times.'
Indeed, in Rosenberger, the Court noted "the reality that student life
in its many dimensions includes the necessity of wide-ranging speech
and inquiry and that student expression is an integral part of the
University's educational mission.""'

In Alpha Delta Chi, the Ninth Circuit failed to adequately
establish the appropriate standards for assessing SDSU's asserted
pedagogical interests by utilizing the standards it applied in a case
involving a high school's nondiscrimination policy.'" The court made
no mention of cases such as Southworth, Rosenberger, or Widmar,'ss
159. See, e.g., Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988-89 ("We owe no deference to universities
when we consider [questions regarding First Amendment protections] .... Cognizant that
judges lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators, however,
we have cautioned courts in various contexts to resist 'substitut[ing] their own notions of
sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.' We
therefore 'approach our task with special caution,' mindful that Hastings' decisions about
the character of its student-group program are due decent respect." (quoting Bd. of Ed. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982) and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972))).
160. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 218
(2000) (noting implicitly that the Court would not defer to a student-fee allocation system
run subject to majority referendum if it would result in the effect of viewpoint
discrimination); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-71, 275-76 (1981) (rejecting a
university's asserted interest in complying with the Establishment Clause and with a state
constitution when singling out religious student groups). For a more in-depth discussion of
these cases, see infra Part III.C.
161. 618 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2010).
162. Id. at 242-43.
163. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995).
164. See Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 798-99 (9th Cir. 2011) (referencing
Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by
L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
165. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 231-32; Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 832-35; Widmar, 454
U.S. at 268-69. For more in-depth discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.B.
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cases where the courts afforded much less deference to the
universities' pedagogical interests and more explicitly compared those
interests with the First Amendment interests asserted by students.166
The Ninth Circuit failed to mention SDSU's stipulation that its
student organization program was designed to "increase the range of
viewpoints advocated in the marketplace of ideas on campus and to
enhance the educational experience for students."s16 Instead, it noted
only SDSU's asserted goal of "promoting diversity and
nondiscrimination,"' 6 concluded that required compliance with the
NDP was a reasonable means of effectuating that goal, and then
immediately moved on in its analysis, failing to apply any judicial
scrutiny to the constitutional validity of that purpose.'"
This omission is critical considering the rights at stake and the
court's own acknowledgement that the NDP disproportionately
burdened religious groups.17 e Had the court adequately scrutinized
the university's asserted purpose, it may have revealed a program
motivated by anti-religious bias or intolerance for viewpoints that
failed to conform to a particular understanding of discrimination. 7
Based on the words of Richard Rorty, a prominent philosophy
professor who taught at universities such as Princeton, Stanford, and
the University of Virginia, unearthing such bias in academia would
not be surprising:
I, like most Americans who teach humanities or social science
in colleges and universities. . . try to arrange things so that
students who enter as bigoted, homophobic, religious
fundamentalists will leave college with views more like our
166. See id.
167. Brief of Appellants at 41, Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d 790 (No. 09-55299), 2009 WL
6303848 at *41.
168. See Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 799.
169. See id. at 800.
170. See id. at 804 (The policy "does not target religious belief or conduct, and does not
'impose special disabilities' on ... religious groups. Any burden on religion is incidental to
the general application of the policy."); see also id. at 805-06 (Ripple, J., concurring)
("The net result of this selective policy is therefore to marginalize in the life of the
institution those activities, practices and discourses that are religiously based.").
171. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v.Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006) ("What
interest does SIU have in forcing CLS to accept members whose activities violate its creed
other than eradicating or neutralizing particular beliefs contained in that creed? SIU has
identified none. The only apparent point of applying the policy to an organization like
CLS is to induce CLS to modify the content of its expression or suffer the penalty of
derecognition."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
CI. L. REV. 195, 222 (1992) ("The correct baseline [for religious freedom] is not
unfettered religious liberty, but rather religious liberty insofar as it is consistent with the
establishment of the secular public moral order.").
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own.... [W]e do our best to convince these students of the
benefits of secularization. We assign first-person accounts of
growing up homosexual to our homophobic students for the
same reasons that German schoolteachers in the postwar period
assigned The Diary of Anne Frank.... There are credentials for
admission to our democratic society, credentials which we
liberals have been making more stringent by doing our best to
excommunicate racists, male chauvinists, homophobes, and the
like. You have to be educated in order to be a citizen of our
society ..

2

Further, evidence that the university may have only enforced the
policies against certain groups, which contributed to remands in both
Alpha Delta Chi and Martinez, should have caused the court to
inquire more closely as to the validity and constitutional
permissibility of SDSU's articulated purpose."' The Ninth Circuit's
complete deference to SDSU's purported pedagogical purposes failed
to provide the constitutionally sufficient judicial check necessary to
protect the plaintiffs' asserted interest.
A third legal problem with the Ninth Circuit's approach to the
school's asserted pedagogical interests is its confusion of how those
interests should affect university regulation of academic programs
versus extracurricular programs. The Ninth Circuit implicitly applied
Martinez's notion that "[a] college's commission-and its
concomitant license to choose among pedagogical approaches-is not
confined to the classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today,
essential parts of the educational process." 1 74 However, this
understanding is inconsistent with other Supreme Court decisions. In
Southworth, the Court presented a different understanding of the
nature of student organization programs: "The University's whole
justification for fostering [a student organization program] is that it
springs from the initiative of the students, who alone give it purpose

172. Richard Rorty, Universality and Truth, in RORTY AND His CRITICS 1, 21-22
(Robert B. Brandom ed., 2000). He continues: "So we are going to go right on trying to
discredit you in the eyes of your children, trying to strip your fundamentalist religious
community of dignity, trying to make your views seem silly rather than discussable. We are
not so inclusivist as to tolerate intolerance such as yours." Id.
173. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 (2010) (remanding
after noting that "[nleither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument
that Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy"); Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 804
("We remand for consideration of the question whether San Diego State has (1) exempted
certain student groups from the nondiscrimination policy; and (2) declined to grant
Plaintiffs such an exemption because of Plaintiffs' religious viewpoint.").
174. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988-89.
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and content in the course of their extracurricular endeavors." 75 As
this excerpt accurately recognizes, if students fail to populate,
facilitate, and lead extracurricular organizations, those organizations
cease to exist. As such, it is inaccurate to frame student organizations
as a primarily university-initiated component of a university's
pedagogical plan to educate its students. The fact that student
organizations are ubiquitous on college campuses and require a
significant amount of logistical support from the university does not
change the fact that education is indeed possible without them and
that they, unlike a university's academic programs, depend entirely
on the voluntary participation of students.' 6 As such, granting
preferential status to the university's pedagogical priorities for
student organizations, especially over objections based on First
Amendment claims, is counter-intuitive since the students are the
true owners, originators, and facilitators of these organizations. 7 7
Finally, the Ninth Circuit erred by misapplying a foundational
text regarding the interaction between the freedom of association and
antidiscrimination laws. The court cited Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees in
support of the following:
San Diego State asserts that the purpose of its
policy . .. is . .. to ensure that the school's resources are "open

to all interested students without regard to special protected
classifications." As the Supreme Court has made clear,
antidiscrimination laws intended to ensure equal access to the
benefits of society serve goals "unrelated to the suppression of
expression" and are neutral as to both content and viewpoint."'
Although the court was unclear regarding what it meant by "benefits
of society," it is clear that it included student groups in this
category.'79 However, as noted above, student organizations are a
manifestation of the collective private activity of students, not a
public resource originating from the initiative of the university. 80 As
such, the court confused the facilitation and regulation of private
activity with the creation and control of that activity. Further, the use
of the term "school resources" is dubious at best. One would think
that the clearest notion of what counts as "school resources" would
175.
176.
177.
178.
623-24
179.
180.

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,229 (2000).
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 801 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
(1984)).
See id. at 801.
See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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be the sort of benefits sought by Alpha Delta Chi: access to student
fees, meeting space on campus, etc. However, by co-opting studentinitiated groups under the umbrella of "school resources," the court
created a self-defeating logical conundrum.' 81 Identifying the student
group as a school resource begs the question of the group's existence.
But if the school's own policies prevent the group from gaining access
to other school resources, then the group may fail to exist in the first
place. Thus, the school actually engages in denying resources to
Alpha Delta Chi and treating the private expressive association as if
the school owns it and can dole it out like any other public benefit.
ConceptualFlaws in Alpha Delta Chi
In addition to numerous legal vulnerabilities, the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Alpha Delta Chi suffers from foundational conceptual
problems as well. The first of these problems arises in how the Ninth
Circuit framed and treated the plaintiff's desired application of the
NDP as a special exemption from the viewpoint neutral and generally
8
This classification is
applicable requirements of SDSU's NDP."'
consistent with how the Supreme Court treated CLS at UC Hastings:
B.

"CLS ... seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential

exemption from [the university's] policy."'83 Framing the issue in this
manner is common in the academy as well. William Marshall, a
professor at the University of North Carolina School of Law, argues
that CLS's arguments, like those asserted by Alpha Delta Chi, would
create a double standard by allowing religious organizations to
discriminate based on religion while preventing secular organizations
from doing so.'" In a similar fashion, Professors Alan Brownstein and
Vikram Amar note that:
CLS argued that it is viewpoint discrimination to prohibit
religious organizations from discriminating on the basis of
181. Despite the logical incoherence, defining student organizations this way is
beneficial for the university's position. As Suffolk University Law Professor Patrick S.
Shin recently wrote, seemingly innocuous decisions on framing issues are often outcomedeterminative. In other words, the means by which policymakers frame issues on the front
end often guide the characterizations of those issues on the back end. See Patrick S. Shin,
DiscriminationUnder a Description, 47 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing how
legal treatment of conduct-based discrimination has differed significantly depending on
what words policymakers chose to describe the discriminatory conduct in question).
182. See Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 800.
183. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).
184. See William P. Marshall, Smith, Christian Legal Society, and Speech-Based Claims
for Religious Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 32 CARDOzO L.
REv. 1937, 1945 (2011).
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religious belief while permitting secular political organizations
to discriminate on the basis of nonreligious belief. But it is not
viewpoint discrimination to prohibit secular political
organizations from discriminating on the basis of religious
belief while permitting religious organizations to discriminate
on the basis of secular beliefs. Religious student organizations
receive more associational autonomy than their secular
counterparts and religious students receive more protection for
their beliefs than students who hold secular beliefs."ss
These arguments essentially contend that affording religious
organizations special treatment would violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment as well as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 6
However, framing the conflict in this way fundamentally
mischaracterizes the issue, leading to errant conclusions. Marshall's
support for an NDP that prohibits religious-based membership
restrictions relies on the notion that this prohibition applies equally to
all groups."' While perhaps correct in theory, this understanding fails
to match the practical realities of NDPs. Anatole France famously
remarked that "[t]he law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as
well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal bread."' 88 In the same way, a university may argue that
prohibitions on discrimination based on religious beliefs apply to all
groups. However, religious groups are really the only groups with any
legitimate reason to concern themselves with their leaders' and
members' religious beliefs." Indeed, litigation regarding university
185. Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a
Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampeningand
Debate DistortingState Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 533 (2011).
186. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ("Every government practice
must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an
endorsement or disapproval of religion."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1704 (3d ed. 2009) (describing the "symbolic endorsement test" approach used by
some Supreme Court Justices, which measures the existence of an Establishment Clause
violation by whether the government action endorses a particular religion or belief); see
also Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96
(1961) (arguing that the Separation Clause in the First Amendment should be read to
"prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden").
187. See Marshall, supra note 184, at 1945.
188. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (Boni and Liveright, Inc. 1910) (1894).
189. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 144, at 30 ("[An employment law prohibition on
religious discrimination] makes sense for nonreligious employers. Wal-Mart should treat
atheists like Catholics; Wal-Mart should treat atheists who impugn Catholicism the same
way it treats Catholics who impugn atheism. But it makes little sense for the law to require
that of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church should not have to hire people who
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NDPs disproportionately involves religious student groupsparticularly Christian ones."
Judge Ripple raises this concern in his concurrence to the Alpha
Delta Chi decision.19 ' After recognizing that many non-religiously
oriented groups are able to discriminate based on commitment to the
ideologies that form the base rationale for organization in the first
place, Judge Ripple notes that "[r]eligious students, however, do not
have this luxury-their shared beliefs coincide with their shared
status. They cannot otherwise define themselves and not run afoul of
the [NDP]." 19 Washington University Law Professor John Inazu
makes the same point that the "artificial distinction between
expression and conduct ... in some cases [is] one and the
same.

. .

. CLS's 'conduct' is inseparable from its message."193 Thus,

arguments defending the validity of NDPs by appealing to "equal
applicability" fail to address the point that religious student groups
are trying to make.
These arguments seem to assume that all discrimination is bad
and that if religious-based discrimination is wrong in some contexts, it
must be wrong in all contexts. In a society that increasingly posits
morally relativistic tolerance as the supreme virtue,1 94 the prevailing
sentiments of NDPs and their legal defenders presume that any form
of discrimination is primafacie invalid. However, as University of San
Diego Law Professor Larry Alexander notes,
[A]IIl of us well-socialized Westerners know that discrimination
against other human beings is wrong. Yet we also realize, if we
think about it at all, that we discriminate against others
routinely and inevitably.' 9 s
Similarly, Notre Dame Law Professor Richard Garnett argues,

openly reject Catholicism as patriarchal and oppressive."); Stanley Fish, Religion Without
Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A15 ("The truth claims of a religion-at least
religions like Christianity, Judaism and Islam-are not incidental to its identity; they are
its identity."), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/31/opinion/31fishs.html.
190. See CARSON, supra note 12, at 31.
191. See Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 805-06 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
192. Id. at 806 (Ripple, J., concurring) (citing Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634,
645 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cnty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447
(2010)).
193. See Inazu, supra note 25, at 196.
194. See CARSON, supranote 12, at 11-12, 74.
195. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases,
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992).
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[T]o label a decision or action "discrimination" is simply to note
that one factor or another was or will be taken into account in
the course of a decision; it is to invite, but not at all to answer,
the questions whether that decision or action was or would be
wrong, and whether the public authority may or should forbid
or discourage it.196
Thus, discrimination cannot be invalid per se. It is the essence of
group formation---distinguishing with regard to which ideological
commitments the group has and which individuals warrant inclusion
based on adherence to those commitments. This occurs with groups
that form intentionally, such as a church, a political party, or a student
group, and groups that form unofficially, such as groups of friends.
The reverse is true as well-individuals also discriminate amongst
ideologically committed associations when they seek out or avoid
involvement in those groups.1'

Thus, Professor Garnett rightly challenges this prevailing norm
by changing the question from whether we should allow
discrimination to when and why we should allow it.'" He argues that
"[w]hen we say that 'discrimination' is wrong, what we actually mean
is that wrongful discrimination is wrong." 19 9 Exactly what
distinguishes wrongful discrimination from legitimate discrimination
is a difficult question. 2 0 Garnett conceptualizes wrongful
discrimination as discrimination that denies human dignity.201
Professor Peter Westen offers insight into the question by asserting
that notions of equality entail that "people who are alike should be
treated alike and its correlative, that people who are unalike should
be treated unalike." 202 Both of these notions imply that people differ
in ways material to how law and society should operate and that law
can utilize these distinctions in a manner that rationally provides for
those differences yet remains faithful to the idea that all people are
created equal.
The current jurisprudence and legal scholarship on NDPs in
public universities fails to account for this important distinction. The
scholarship frames the actions of groups like CLS and Alpha Delta
196. See Garnett, supranote 12, at 198-99.
197. See id. at 197.
198. See id. at 198-99.
199. See id. at 198.
200. See infra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
201. See Garnett, supra note 12, at 217.
202. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
(citations omitted).

HARV.

L. REV. 538, 539-40 (1982)
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Chi as hypocritical and reliant on double standards in its pursuit of
narrow exemptions to otherwise universally applicable NDPs.203 But
such an argument implies that the groups merely sought the exclusive
ability to act in a way that they knew was wrongful. What such groups
really assert, to the contrary, is that it is not wrongful to restrict
candidacy for religious leadership to candidates who actually affirm,
in both word and deed, the very beliefs and standards to which the
group holds in the first place.2" Because the identity and existence of
an ideologically driven student group derives from its common
ideological commitment, the survival of such a group logically
depends on its ability to preserve and protect the ideology that
motivated the group's formation.2 05 Just as a vegetarian student group
organizes to learn about and advocate for vegetarianism, a religious
group such as Alpha Delta Chi organizes to learn about and advocate
for its religious beliefs on campus. 06 To require any of these groups to
accept leaders or members with views antithetical to those of the
group would go beyond simply forcing association on the unwilling; it
would change the fundamental nature of the group. This is an
instance in which the discrimination is not wrongful because it is done
with the purpose of maintaining the identity and purpose of a group,
not with the purpose or effect of denigrating an individual's worth or
dignity. Thus, CLS and Alpha Delta Chi's actions are not wrongful
discrimination, but rather legitimate discrimination that is wrong only
in other contexts.
A second conceptual problem with the court's rationales for
upholding SDSU's NDP is the unsound argument that the university's
stance is viewpoint neutral. The notion that a university's NDP can be
neutral is often based on whether the NDP applies to all student
203. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 184, at 1945.
204. Garnett, supra note 12, at 202-03.
205. Id. at 197 ("'Discrimination,' after all, is just another word for discernment, and
for choosing and acting in accord with or with reference to particular criteria. We do, and
should, 'discriminate'-that is, draw lines, identify limits, make judgments, act on the basis
of preferences-all the time.").
206. While this sentence suggests that religious groups are on par in a legal sense with
other ideologically motivated groups, the Supreme Court has suggested that this is
different and that religion has special privileges under the First Amendment that secular
groups do not have. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) ("The right to freedom of association is a right enjoyed by
religious and secular groups alike. It follows under the EEOC's.. . view that the First
Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is the
Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club. That result is hard to square with the text
of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations.").
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groups regardless of convictions and whether it affirmatively
articulates a preference with regard to any of the classifications for
which it prohibits discrimination.2 07 This concept is tied intimately to
broader arguments that government action must be morally neutralarguments that enjoy great power, influence, and pervasiveness
within the courts and the legal academy. 20 Arguments for
government neutrality are most prevalent in controversial social
issues such as abortion2 9 and sexual morality 210 for which there is no
clear societal consensus on the morality governing such issues.
Notions of moral neutrality arise in uncontroversial areas as well,
where the lack of controversy or the law's conformance with the
prevailing moral sentiment feeds a societal assumption that law can
be neutral.211
Despite its rhetorical appeal, the notion that government action
can be morally neutral is intellectually untenable.212 Government
inaction can and often does have just as much moral significance as
207. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2996 (2010) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("It does not reflect a judgment by school officials about the substance of
any student group's speech. Nor does it exclude any would-be groups on the basis of their
convictions. Indeed, it does not regulate expression or belief at all.").
208. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) ("Men
and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree,
about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its
earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code." (emphasis added)); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2004) (concluding "that mere reference to morality
should not suffice as a justification for lawmaking").
209. See, e.g., Casey, 550 U.S. at 850.
210. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (holding that the "majority
may [not] use the power of the State to enforce [moral views regarding homosexual
conduct] on the whole society through operation of the criminal law").
211. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Render Unto Caesar That Which Is Caesar's, and
Unto God That Which Is God's, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495, 499 (2008) ("[W]e must
begin by remembering that all of our legal rules-including the basic prohibitions against
murder, assault, and robbery-have religious and moral underpinnings." (emphasis
added)).
212. See, e.g., CARSON, supra note 12, at 87-92 (arguing that framing non-religious
arguments as "neutral" actually advances an alternative set of beliefs and moral
assertions); cf TIMOTHY KELLER, THE REASON FOR GOD, at xvii (2008) ("[Elven as
[religious persons] should learn to look for reasons behind their faith, skeptics must learn
to look for a type of faith hidden within their reasoning. All doubts, however skeptical and
cynical they may seem, are really a set of alternate beliefs. You cannot doubt Belief A
except from a position of faith in Belief B. For example, if you doubt Christianity because
'There can't be just one true religion,' you must recognize that this statement is itself an
act of faith. No one can prove it empirically, and it is not a universal truth that everyone
accepts.").
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action, and legislation based on moral consensus does not somehow
render such laws less based on morality or more objective. For
example, many argue that legalized abortion avoids the need to
legislate morality by leaving the actual choice of whether to abort a
baby with the woman.? However, what legalized abortion really
demonstrates is a moral choice by society to prefer the moral value of
a woman's bodily autonomy to the moral value presented by the life
in the womb. From another perspective, legalized abortion simply
demonstrates society's judgment that the moral questions pertaining
to the baby's life, or even the "potential" life in the womb, are not
morally significant enough to address in the legislature or the courts.
Try as we may, "[1]aw and morality are inevitably intertwined"' and
thus, "[t]he real question is not whether the government has a role in
prescribing morals, but which type of morality the government should
prescribe."2"
SDSU asserted, and the court agreed, that its NDP was
viewpoint neutral because it subjected all student groups to the
requirements of the policy and because any burdens it imposed on
specific groups were incidental.2 6 However, the policy's language and
the practical effects of enforcement evidenced in Alpha Delta Chi
reveal two distinct fallacies in this argument. First, the argument
treats diversity and nondiscrimination as morally neutral ideals. In
reality, the fact that the university is promoting these ideals is itself a
moral assertion. It asserts that the goals of diversity and
nondiscrimination are good, desirable, and morally worthy goals and
that they are morally preferable to goals of free expression or
particular religious values.2 17 Second, the fact that the NDP only
prohibits some types of discrimination demonstrates the lack of
viewpoint neutrality in the university's stance. By failing to prohibit
all forms of discrimination, SDSU's policy articulates a viewpoint that
only some types of discrimination are wrong. Thus, the policy treats
similarly situated student groups differently; any group that disagrees
213. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
214. Calabresi, supra note 211, at 500.
215. G. Marcus Cole, What Is the Government's Role in Promoting
Morah? ... Seriously?, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 79 (2008).
216. See Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1743 (2012).
217. See, e.g., CARSON, supra note 12, at 81 ("[Tlhe new tolerance, while making its
claims to be free from any ethical, moral, or religious system of thought, is in fact hugely
inconsistent. The problem, I shall argue, is worse than mere inconsistency in an argument:
it is in fact smuggling into the culture massive structures of thought and imposing them on
others who disagree, while insisting that the others are the intolerant people.").
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with the university with respect to the wrongfulness of a particular
form of discrimination is prohibited from access to the university's
student organization program.218 The results are far from "incidental"
as the court claims 219 and more akin to censorship. SDSU's NDP is
itself discriminatory and failure to properly perceive and engage with
that truth can only operate to divorce jurisprudence on NDPs from
reality.
C

PracticalProblemsfor NDPs
Upholding the validity of NDPs like SDSU's presents practical
problems as well. A glaring problem of narrow NDPs is whether or
not such policies themselves can ever truly be applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner. As noted above, religious groups are not
the only groups with rational reasons for limiting membership based
on characteristics identified by policies like SDSU's. 20 In Alpha Delta
Chi, SDSU stipulated that restrictive membership policies were
prevalent on campus, 22' and the court's remand to the district court
was based in part on factual findings that SDSU's African Student
Drama Association allowed only students from Africa to hold
leadership positions.22 2 Similarly, student a capella groups, Greek
organizations, and club sports teams routinely discriminate based on
gender. Universities must allow for at least some exceptions to these
policies in order for groups to remain distinctive.223 Yet, these
permitted discriminatory practices rarely cause controversy because
the group's rationales for discriminating often make sense in light of
218. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844 (1995)
(discussing how policies prohibiting religious groups depend not on a position of true
neutrality, but must assess potential violations on standards of "secular orthodoxy"); see
also Minow, supra note 12, at 826 ("Nonreligious people may think that it is the secular
space that is neutral and all-encompassing, but religious people do not. For them, the
secular is one of many spaces, and potentially one that is threatening to commitments and
practices held dear." (citing Nancy Rosenblum, Introduction to OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 3,5 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000))).
219. See Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 801.
220. See supra Part II.B.
221. Brief of Appellants at 10-11, Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d 790 (No. 09-55299), 2009
WL 6303848 at *10-11.
222. See Alpha Delta Chi, 648 F.3d at 804.
223. For example, if the Republican Club is forced to accept Green Party members,
then it is no longer a Republican Club, but rather a Republican and Green Party Club. See
Garnett, supra note 12, at 210-11 ("[Tlhe particular membership criteria that the CLS
sought to employ-that is, the Statement of Faith and compliance with traditional
Christian standards of sexual morality-are controversial, but it does not and should not
strike many people as wrong for, say, a Republican club to exclude registered Green Party
members.").
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the organization's stated purpose.224 However, each additional
exception that a university grants from an NDP further erodes the
policy's general applicability, thus undermining a critical element of
the policy's claim to legal permissibility and coherency.22 5 Actions
singling out religious groups begin to look arbitrary and indefensible.
The fact that this problem arose in Martinez,2 2 6 Walker,227 and again in
Alpha Delta Chi228 lends credibility to questions of whether these
policies can ever be applied in a manner that is truly
nondiscriminatory without destroying all semblance of group
autonomy.
Another practical problem raised by the narrower brand of
NDPs pertains to the task of deciphering a group's ideological
convictions and corresponding motivations
behind those
2 29
convictions. As Professor Marshall has noted, deciphering between
belief and animus in the context of religious organizations can be an
exceedingly difficult task. 230 At least one author has questioned
whether deciphering such dubious distinctions is possible, or even
desirable.231 Why then delegate to the university the power to
decipher distinctions between an individual's status and beliefs or
between belief and animus?23 2 The American legal and political
224. See id.
225. See Minow, supra note 12, at 788 ("Yet each additional exemption from a general
rule further undermines the governmental purpose behind its rule.").
226. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2995 (2010) ("Neither the
District Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument that Hastings selectively
enforces its all-comers policy .... "); see also id. at 3004 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
record is replete with evidence that, at least until Dean Kane unveiled the accept-allcomers policy in July 2005, Hastings routinely registered student groups with bylaws
limiting membership and leadership positions to those who agreed with the groups'
viewpoints.").
227. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006) ("For
whatever reason, SIU has applied its antidiscrimination policy to CLS alone, even though
other student groups discriminate in their membership requirements on grounds that are
prohibited by the policy.").
228. See Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
229. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 29, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 2414707 at * 29
("Even reasons that sound superficially secular are often religious at their core."); see also
Lund, supra note 144, at 34 (discussing how difficult it may be to distinguish between
religious and nonreligious decisions by a church).
230. See Marshall,supra note 184, at 1941.
231. See Note, supra note 25, at 2900-02.
232. See, e.g., United States. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2564 (2012) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) ("The point is not that there is no such thing as truth or falsity in these areas or
that the truth is always impossible to ascertain, but rather that it is perilous to permit the
state to be the arbiter of truth."); Alpha Iota Omega v. Moeser, No. 1:04CV00765, 2006
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tradition has long been skeptical of the government's use of coercive
power within the marketplace of ideas, and for good
reason.2 33Andrew Koppelman has stated that "it is unseemly, and
potentially abusive, for [government actors] to tell organizationsparticularly organizations with dissenting .. . views-what their
positions are." 23 4 Despite the danger posed,235 advocacy for this
concept persists in legal scholarship.236
Professor Inazu's article points out the problems of courts
finding comfort in "reasonable alternatives" for a student
organization that has been denied official recognition.23 7 Courts have
repeatedly given significant weight to alternatives such as social
media and off-campus meeting places in determining the
reasonableness of NDPs.2 38 Even with these alternatives, however,
non-recognized student groups are still at a significant disadvantage
as compared to groups with access to these benefits. As Professor
Inazu's article points out, failure to obtain official recognition and its
corresponding benefits often results in the death of a student

WL 1286186, at *5 (M.D.N.C. May 4,2006) (discussing the need for universities to strike
a balance between protecting the First Amendment rights of students and "maintaining
'viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding support' " (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233 (2000))).
233. See, e.g., Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1991) ("[P]erhaps the worst umpires or referees of truth are the oppressive
arms of government which will always attempt to impose an orthodoxy consonant with the
frequently corrupt interests of the bureaucracy.").
234. ANDREw KOPPELMAN & TOBIAS BENJAMIN WOLFF, A RIGHT TO
DISCRIMINATE? 24 (2009).
235. See Lund, supra note 144, at 55-57 (describing how juries unfamiliar with or
hostile toward a specific religion are especially susceptible to suggestions that the religious
organization under scrutiny used religious beliefs as a pretext for an action that was
actually discriminatory).
236. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2023
(2007) ("[F]or churches that do not claim that their tenets require discrimination, a
decision influenced by discrimination is a mistake (or worse) from the church's point of
view, and the state is merely requiring the church to fix it.").
237. Inazu, supra note 25, at 190-97 ("[W]ithholding some benefits-like access to
meeting space or email lists or the opportunity to be part of a public forum-can be akin
to stomping out a group's existence. After [Martinez], the Hastings-Christian-Group-thatAccepts-All-Comers can exist, and the Christian-Legal-Society-for-Hastings-LawStudents-that-Can-Sometimes-Meet-on-Campus-as-a-Matter-of-University-Discretion-IfSpace-Is-Available-but-Can't-Recruit-Members-at-the-Student-Activities-Fair can exist.
But the Hastings Christian Legal Society-whose views and purposes are in no way
sanctioned by and can be explicitly disavowed by Hastings-cannot.").
238. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2991 (2010); Alpha
Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 799 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).
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organization.239 In 2005, the members of a Jewish fraternity at the
College of Staten Island were denied official recognition for
restricting membership to men.240 After losing its suit in federal
court,24 1 the fraternity disbanded.242 Similarly, at the time of this
writing, the Christian Legal Society at UC Hastings no longer appears
to exist. 243 As these instances indicate, the alternatives that courts
have deemed reasonable do not adequately take into consideration
the vital importance of access to student fees, recruitment activities,
and university communication services to the existence of on-campus
student organizations.
Finally, if a university is genuinely committed to fostering
diversity of people and of viewpoints, protecting a wide variety of
ideological commitments is critical. Most NDPs are fundamentally
oriented toward the individual and conceptualize the only means of
promoting campus diversity as guaranteeing diverse viewpoints within
student organizations." However, allowing a College Republican to
hold office in the Young Democrats compromises the Young

239. Inazu, supra note 25, at 197; accord Lund, supra note 144, at 27 (arguing that if the
ministerial exception is extinguished, "churches will exist only at the sufferance of
government-any hostile government could choose to destroy them by simply passing a
generally applicable religious discrimination law and then making no exception for
religious groups").
240. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 443 F. Supp.
2d 374, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007).
241. Chi Iota Colony, 502 F.3d at 139.
242. Inazu, supra note 25, at 191.
C.L.,
CAL.
HASTINGS
U.
Student
Organizations,
243. See
(last visited Oct. 14,
http://www.uchastings.edu/student-services/student-orgs/index.htm
2012).
244. Leading universities from around the country require student organization
compliance with NDP for registration; these NDPs generally explicitly prohibit
discrimination against individuals of certain protected classifications, but contain no
mention of group autonomy. See, e.g., UNIV. OF VA. COLL. AT WISE, STUDENT ORG.
HANDBOOK 2010-2011, at 20 (2010), http://www.wise.virginia.edu/studentlife/files
/studentlife/StudentOrganizationHandbook 2010_2011.pdf; Nondiscrimination Policy,
VANDERBILT U., http://www.vanderbilt.edu/student-handbook/university-policies-andregulations#equal ("Registered student organizations must be open to all students as
members and must permit all members in good standing to seek leadership posts.") (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012); Student Orgs: Requirements for Registration, U. MICH.,
(last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
http://studentorgs.umich.edu/guidebook/requirements
(requiring organization compliance with the university's NDP, found at
http://www.umich.edu/policy nondescrim.php). Some universities do provide for some
accommodation of group autonomy in the form of exceptions for religious beliefs. See
UNIV.
OF FL.,
STUDENT
ACTIVITIES
AND
INVOLVEMENT
2 (2011),
https://www.studentinvolvement.ufl.edu/Portals/1/Documents/Organizations/Register/Doc
s/Policy%20UF%20constitution%20guidelines%201112%20sg%20info%20included%20new%20logo%20updated%20nondiscrimtation.pdf.
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Democrats' ability to preserve faithfulness to Democratic ideology.24 5
A broader perspective on diversity, one that considers both group
autonomy and individual interests, reveals that a university can better
promote diversity through ensuring strong protections for groups to
develop their ideological stances and to offer a safe zone for those
who are like-minded.2 4 6 Protecting group autonomy will enable
diverse, ideologically-driven groups to develop and articulate ideas
more effectively, enhancing campus dialogue by increasing the
coherency of diverse viewpoints, sharpening the distinction between
divergent ideas, and broadening the opportunity for intellectual
progress through the marketplace of ideas.
IV. A WORKABLE POLICY
The problems plaguing NDPs admittedly arise from the difficult
task of balancing several competing goals. The clear and
overwhelming trend in academia has demonstrated a strong
preference for prioritizing the norms of equal access, diversity, and
nondiscrimination. Unfortunately, as examples such as Martinez and
Alpha Delta Chi demonstrate, prioritizing those goals has frequently
come at the expense of expressive freedoms. "[O]ur
constitutionalism ... includes values other than equality... ."247
Indeed, the First Amendment and its jurisprudential progeny provide
stalwart protections for the freedoms of conscience, thought, and
expression by way of protecting speech, association, assembly, and
the free exercise of religion.2 As demonstrated above, the current
methods utilized have not only significant legal and conceptual
vulnerabilities, but are counterproductive to the inquisitive and
deliberative environments that universities ought to be.
Moving forward, several principles derived from the analysis in
Part III should guide attempts to balance these goals. Most
importantly and most practically, universities must acknowledge that

245. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 144, at 39 ("Any lay person can imagine the serious
burden that is placed on churches and congregations who would have to accept a minister
whose spiritual authority they reject. Week after week, churches will have to get by with a
minister they do not want and that they do not believe God wants them to have.").
246. See infra notes 258-70 and accompanying text (discussing the marketplace of
ideas).
247. Inazu, supra note 25, at 152-53.
248. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
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not all discrimination is wrongful and adjust their goals accordingly. 24 9
This fundamental failure to do so has resulted in NDPs that
overreach, chill expression, compromise robust ideological debate,
and destabilize the moral grounds for opposing truly wrongful
discrimination. Universities should adopt a comprehensive
understanding of diversity that acknowledges that having a student
body that looks different does not guarantee having a student body
that thinks differently. If the academy is truly devoted to promoting
an atmosphere composed of and intellectually interested in a variety
of viewpoints, the methods the university employs toward that end
should look past the traditional indicators of diversity, such as race,
nationality, and sex, and consider genuine ideological diversity such
as religious, political, and philosophical viewpoints. Additionally,
universities must acknowledge that associational rights matter, that
individual rights have limits, and that forced acceptance of members
and leaders into unwilling groups is not the only means of achieving
diversity. The current approach, to the contrary, forces association
upon the unwilling250 and idolizes the rights of the individual at the
expense of the rights of the group.
Public universities can put these principles into practice by
ensuring two primary elements in their NDPs. First, NDPs should
clearly articulate the ability for ideologically oriented student groups
to restrict membership and leadership based on the ideological
commitments that form the basis for the group's existence. These
protections should take place within the context of an otherwise
universally applicable policy that prohibits discrimination on any
other grounds. While universities should demonstrate substantial
deference to the groups in stipulating their ideologies, especially
when they are controversial or unpopular,2*' deference to ideological
convictions should not be unbridled. Discrimination that either
propagates or engages in violence should be prohibited.252 The First
249. See supra Part III.B.
250. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010)
("'Freedom of association,' we have recognized, 'plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.' Insisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members, we have therefore
concluded, 'directly and immediately affects associational rights.' " (quoting Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659
(2000))); Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2006).
251. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) ("The First Amendment does not
guarantee that other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole-such as the
principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive-will go
unquestioned in the marketplace of ideas.").
252. See Inazu, supra note 25, at 204.
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Amendment itself conditions the right of assembly on such assembly
being peaceable; thus, for this reason and many others, nonviolence is
a reasonable and essential limitation to place on student
organizations. 253 Discrimination by student groups should also comply
with various legal provisions whereby the government has
constitutional authority to prohibit discrimination on classifications
such as race.254 Barring these forms of violent or illegal behavior,
however, student groups should generally enjoy substantial deference
in defining their ideological commitments.
Although these protections may appear to be exceptions that
swallow the rule, what they actually do is distinguish between
wrongful and non-wrongful discrimination. Rather than fracturing the
foundations of an existing rule, this more nuanced approach crafts a
more narrowly tailored rule by prohibiting all discrimination that is
not reasonably related to the group's interest in protecting its
ideological identity and expression. Further, a student rejected from
membership in an organization on ideological grounds is not without
remedy. The rejected student may simply start her own organization
in the same manner as the organization that rejected her on
ideological grounds."
In addition to protecting reasonable membership restrictions,
NDPs should provide clear procedural mechanisms regulating
membership restrictions and disputes arising from them. When the
UNC Task Force began meeting to discuss revisions to the
university's NDP following the incident with the Christian a capella
group, two of the chief concerns that arose were the undefined
standards applied by the group and the university's lack of clear
procedures for dealing with an alleged violation of the policy. 25 6
Indeed, there is much to be gained by all interested parties in
253. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
254. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961)
(finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in circumstances where the State has
"insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with a private actor that acts in a
discriminatory manner); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (finding that under
Amendment XIII of the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to remedy
the "badges and incidents of slavery").
255. The money used to fund student organization programs often comes not from the
university, but from mandatory fees charged to students. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 222 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995). Thus, student organization program benefits are
public goods or "benefits of society," Alpha Delta Chi v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012), and should be available to any student who has
paid the fee.
256. See Vest, supra note 9.
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clarifying the process in each of these areas. For example, NDPs
could institute high evidentiary requirements regarding what
ideological commitments the organization requires for membership
or leadership and ensure that each of its members affirm the group's
core commitments prior to attaining such status? 7 Regulations such
as these will add consistency and transparency to the way that student
organizations select and remove members or leaders and to the way
that the university investigates student organizations charged with
violating the policy. The regulations will protect both student
organizations and university administrators from accusations of
arbitrarily targeting or employing animus or bias in how they enforce
their policies upon students or student groups, respectively. Finally,
procedural protections will provide clear standards and easy-to-apply
mechanisms for both student organizations and universities in dealing
with disputes between students and student organizations.
In addition to yielding benefits in the context of individual
disputes, altering the conceptual and practical landscapes of
nondiscrimination policies will yield broader systemic benefits as well.
Fostering expressive association provides a far better method of
exposing undesirable ideas by subjecting such forms of expression,
whether controversial or not, to the marketplace of ideas.258 As
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, "[T]he best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . ."25 This is true all the more in a setting where intellectual
scrutiny and competition for intellectual viability is perhaps at its
highest level in our society-the university. 26 oRosenberger noted that
257. These evidentiary burdens could be high, but they would also need to be flexible
with regard to how student groups could choose to demonstrate their beliefs. Requiring a
student group to place its beliefs into a written document, for example, could constitute
compelled speech, which the Supreme Court has held invalid in cases such as Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (invalidating a state law that
required professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors that the charities were
paying the fundraisers to solicit donations).
258. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) in WRITINGS
492, 492-93 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (arguing that one can safely allow for "error of
opinion ... where reason is left free to combat it").

259. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see

also MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7-12 (1984) ("If acceptance

of an idea in the competition of the market is not the 'best test' for this purpose, what is
the alternative?").
260. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("The essentiality of
freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. ... To impose
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.... Teachers and students must always
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the university holds a central place as "one of the vital centers for the
Nation's intellectual life" 26 ' and argued that the "danger [of chilling
speech] is especially real in the University setting, where the State
acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment
that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition."262
Accordingly, protecting expressive association and expression
more generally in the university is of "critical importance."6 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that "free
speech... is the lifeblood of academic freedom." 2" Allowing
discriminatory expression in an intellectually fierce environment like
the university will subject the animus-based discrimination feared by
some265 to intense scrutiny and pressure. Aside from cementing the
opposition of those already against the discriminatory ideas proposed,
the intellectual and societal pressure applied to those ideas will cause
more organic change among those indifferent to the ideas and
perhaps even within the group that originally promotes them.26 6 As
Justice Brandeis famously quipped, "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants,"2 6 and thus, whether such ideas survive would depend
on the proponents' willingness and ability to defend such animus,
both intellectually and personally. 2' After all, as Andrew Koppelman
has noted, "Discrimination is not so cheap as it was before, and a
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." (emphasis added)); McCauley v. Univ. of
the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Public universities encourage teachers and
students to launch new inquiries into our understanding of the world.").
261. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995).
262. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
263. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314 (3d Cir. 2008).
264. Id.
265. See Marshall,supranote 184, at 1941-42.
266. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
("It is. .. the right to err politically, which keeps us strong as a Nation. For no number of
laws against communism can have as much effect as the personal conviction which comes
from having heard its arguments and rejected them, or from having once accepted its
tenets and later recognized their worthlessness."); Minow, supra note 12, at 782 ("Even
advocates for antidiscrimination norms may find it wise to back off from direct
governmental regulation of religious groups' employment practices in order to allows
struggles over discrimination issues to proceed internally within particular religious
communities. Changes would then be legitimate and meaningful if the religious group
stands against discrimination in its employment practices and programs.").
267. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1932) (1913).
268. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[Tihe fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.... [T]he remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence."); Proverbs 18:6-7 (English Standard Version) ("A
fool's lips walk into a fight, and his mouth invites a beating. A fool's mouth is his ruin, and
his lips are a snare to his soul.").
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group will have to decide whether discrimination is worth the added
cost."2 * The alternative approach, forcibly imposing flawed
nondiscrimination norms on unwilling groups, may result in
profoundly negative reactions.2 70
In addition to stigmatizing wrongful discrimination, promoting a
truly open forum for a wide variety of student expression will result in
a campus forum that is better primed for dialogue. Open dialogue
allows space for clarity on certain viewpoints that appear arbitrarily
discriminatory but are perhaps well-founded and intellectually
rational.27 1 It will protect the ability of minority groups to shape,
articulate, and advocate for views that challenge the majority
stance. 272 For example, "[t]he rise of gay equality and public visibility
coincided-not coincidentally, however-with the rise of vigorous
269. KOPPELMAN & WOLFF, supra note 234, at xiii.
270. See Minow, supra note 12, at 823-24 ("Religious people who have traveled here
for religious freedom may well move again, or mobilize to fight back. Religious groups,
once mobilized to fight against civil rights reforms, can be effective in ways that make life
worse for the intended beneficiaries of the reforms. Backlash to progressive social
change can produce newly restrictive treatment, undermine initial reforms, erode public
support for the government that was pursuing the reform, and further mobilize
reactionary forces with even broader agendas for retrenchment. In addition, backlash can
eliminate informal accommodations that may have taken place and produce rigidity in the
positions taken by competing groups that otherwise might reach practical
accommodations.").
271. Few statements better encapsulate this notion than Justice Brandeis's poetic
concurrence in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence... believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to
which all human institutions are subject ... that it is hazardous to discourage
thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the
argument of force in its worse form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of
governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and
assembly should be guaranteed.
274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
272. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 93, 95 (Michael B. Mathias ed.,
Pearson Longman 2007) (1859) ("[H]owever true [something] may be, if it is not fully,
frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living
truth.... He who knows only his own side of the case ... has no ground for preferring
either opinion.").
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protection for . .. the freedom of association" 273 despite the efforts of
public universities "to bar gay rights groups from recognized student
organization status on account of their supposed encouragement of
what was then illegal behavior."2 74 Free speech is vital because
someone is bound to disagree, and that someone may have
substantial political or cultural power.2 5 As Professor Inazu noted,
"We tolerate these forms of expression not because we endorse them
or seek to emulate them, but because we recognize the state's
tendencies to dominate and control through the interpretations and
meanings it assigns to a group's activities."276 Maximizing the ability
of students to exercise expressive rights would best align a public
university's NDP with the overarching pedagogical goals at the
university level where expression, exploration, and intellectual
dialogue are paramount.2 77 Accordingly, the suggestions above
provide a reasonable approach to balancing competing fundamental
interests in a manner that better effectuates the university's goal of
stigmatizing elements of discriminatory animus and behavior while
simultaneously maximizing students' fundamental expressive rights.
CONCLUSION

The current legal status of NDPs in the context of public
university student organization policies is plagued by legal
uncertainty, conceptual inconsistency, and clumsy, ineffective
approaches to balancing the competing constitutional interests of
equal treatment and free expression. The practical result is a culture
in higher academia where, as a Harvard graduate once noted in a
commencement speech, "The freedom of our day is the freedom to
devote ourselves to any values we please, on the mere condition that
we do not believe them to be true."2 78 Unfortunately, the requirement
of actual controversy and the winner-take-all nature of the
adversarial system render litigation an unlikely venue from which to
find a result that sufficiently incorporates all relevant concerns. As
273. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law after Dale:
A TripartiteApproach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1532-33 (2001).
274. Brief for Petitioner at 30, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)
(No. 08-1371), 2010 WL 711183 at *30.
275. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The freedoms... guaranteed by the First Amendment
must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas
we cherish.").
276. See Inazu, supra note 25, at 203.
277. See supra Part ILA.

278.
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such, universities should take the initiative to be deliberative and
innovative in exploring new, untested models that will protect
expressive freedoms by properly distinguishing between prudential,
expressive discrimination and wrongful, invidious discrimination.
Under this system, where diversity, freedom of expression, and group
autonomy are all respected, universities will maintain their status as
bastions of "free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital
centers for the Nation's intellectual life."279
ANDREW
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279. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995).
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